INTRODUCTION
The potential conflicts between the substantive provisions of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and the ni!es governing the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been the subject of much debate \'lithin these institutions, and· among stakeholders and the academie world. Little has been said, however, about the averlap or conflicts that could arise due to their parallel dispute-seUlement mechanisms and the resulting fot•mn shopping that could dismpt the certainty achieved by the regolation of intemational relations through dispute-seUlement mechanisms.
This al1icle identifies sorne of the issues that may have ta be addressed, as weil as sorne of the argoments and alternatives that may be suggested, ta prevent WTO members and non-member States from pursuing multiple dispute-seUlement courses use]essly and to ensure th at the most approptiately equipped fora are responsible for seUiing disputes. Even if the dispute-settlement mechanism envisaged by fhe WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures for the SeUlement of Disputes (DSU)' seems more powetful and effective than many MEA dispute-seUlement mechanisms, other means do exist and are explored in this atticle, with a view that parallel dispute-seUlement mechanisms be used for the best interests of WTO members and stakeholders.
OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF MEAS AND THOSE OF THE WTO
It bas been argoed that authentic trade measures required or explicitly permitted by a MEA should be considered compatible with the invocation of Atticle 1 Understanding on Ru\e.s and Procedur~ for the SeUlement of Disputes {DSU), General Agreement on Tartffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act E:mbodying the Resu\ts of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994) . Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) , which, under cmtain conditions, authorizes WTO members to deviate from GATT mies, including its market access disciplines, to give priority to one ofits listed policy considerations.' This detives from the application of the general principle of interpretation, which provides fol' a presumption against conflicts between treaty provisions. WTO panels and the Appellate Body are obliged ta take into account this presumption pursuant to Atticle 3(2) of the DSU when interpreting and applying the WTO provisions, including Atticle XX of GATT.
XX of the General Agreement an
WTO members are allowed to take measures that may resttict trade if such measures respect the presctiptions of Al1icle XX. Al'ticle XX(g) refers to measures relating to the protection of natural resources and At1icle XX(b) refers to measures necessary for the protection ofhealth of persans, animais and plants. The fact th at an envimnmental problem is regolated and protected by the international community through a MEA lends weight to the claim that a measure, adopted pursuant to such negotiated MEA provisions, is based on authentic environ mental motivations and may therefore be considered as re la ting ta the pmtection of naturaloesources or be necessruy for fhe pmtection ofhealth or the environment This is especially true with fhe new 'necessity tesf developed by the Appellate Body, where it is established that assessments, if a measure qualifies for the put'POSe of Atticle XX(b ), in volve a pro cess of weighing and balancing a selies of factors, which include: (1) the impmtance of the common interests or values protected by the measure; (2) the efficacy of such measure in pursuing the poli ci es aimed at; and (3) the accompanying impact of the law or regolation on impotts or expotts (the 'resttictiveness' ctitetia)." The more vital or impottant the poli ci es to which a measure is aimedl the easier it is to accept it as a 'necessary' measure designed for that Plll'Pose. The very existence of a MEA may be argucd as evidence that the concerns covered hy the MEA are vital and important and, thus, 'necessary'.
That a measure is applied in accord ance '\vith the fmmeworkset out in a MEA can also be of sorne relevancewhen assessing whether the measure was applied in compliance with the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX, thal is, not being a disguised restriction on international trade. Pat1icipation and compliance wilh MEAs could be ofrelevance to assessing the good faith ofWTO members invoking Al1icle XX. 4 Importantly, Article XX pet·mits cet1ain unilateral actions to be taken to pt·omote environmental goals, even in the absence of a MEA on the subject matter! It would be illogical if a WTO member, acting in furthe.-ance of the goals of a relevant MEA (and pat1y to such a MEA), was to be placed in a worse position than if no such MEA existed.
So far, trade measures taken by WTO members pursuant to MEAs or pm-suant to recommendations by MEA institutional bodies have not been challenged at the WTO. Fpr instance, in the context of the noncompliance mechanism uhder the Montreal Protocol, the Meeting of the Pat1ies, ptior to the recommendation of the Protocol's Implementation Committee, decided to impose a combina tian of measures. consisting, inter alia, of restrictions on Russia's trade in controlled substances to facilitate Russia's compliance with ils obligations und et· the Protocol. 6 Un der the Con ven- 
Ciear1y
, and "as far as possible", a multilateral approach is strongly preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefera mljtilateral approach in the application of a measure thal is provisionally justifie cl under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT: it is another to require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding "arbitrary or unjustifiable dis· elimination~ under the chapeau of Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement'. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE WTO AND THOSE OF MEAS MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WTO DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
Tite dispute-seUlement mechanism of the WTO is 'a central element in providing secmity and predictability to the multilateral trading system'' The system is an elaboration of the GATI !hat preceded it. However, the system under GATI had no fixed timetables, many cases dragged on for a long ti me inconclusively, rulings were easier to block, and implementation of reports as weil as retaliatoty actions were rarely regulated. (October 1999) .
'DSU, Arlide 3(2).
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of GATT in introducing a more structured proccss. The WTO dispute-seUlement mechanism functions according to a pdnciple of reversed consensus (also called negative consensus). According to this principle, many steps and procedural stages happen automatically, within pre-determined time limits, unless, by consensus, WTO members agree othetwise. Panels and Appellate Body reports must now be adopted by all members sitting in the Dispute-SeUlement Body (DSB), unless there is consensus ta the contrary (the reversed or negative consensus): this is what is called the 'quasi-automaticity' of the new dispute-seUlement mechanism of the WTO. process and implementation. Atticle 4(2) ofthe DSU requires that countries in dispute enter into consultations -generally for at !east 60 days -prior ta bringing a request fat· the establishment of a panel ta adjudicate over the matter. If consultations fail, the complaining patty may request the DSB ta establish a panel." The DSB is composed of ali WTO mernbers and is responsible for administering the DSU and overseeing the operation of the dispute-seUlement system. The panel will be established, at the latest, by the second DSB meeting after it is requested. <S Panels are composed of tlll"ee well-qualified individuals, proposed by the WTO Secretariat, wh ose proposais may only be rejected by the parties of the dispute for compelling reasons.' 6 In practice, disputing members exercise stl'Ong political control over the selection of panelists. After 21 days, absent any agreement on the selection of panelists, any pal1y can request the Director-General of the WTO to nominate panelists. The main stages of the panel procedure include the submission in writing by each patty of their case, a first meeting between the parties and the panel, foiJowed hy written rebuttals and a second meeting (as weil as the hearing of expel1s" in cases involving scientific or technical matters). After an interim repmt is released, the panel's final repol1 is generally given to the padies of the dispute within 9 months and circulated to ali WTO members within 2 months thereafter.
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The panel repmt must be adopted by the DSB within 60 days ofits circulation (ùnless it is appealed)."
Pat·ties to a dispute can appeal any panel's findings on points of law, but the Appellate Body cannat reexamine existing evidence or examine new evidence.zo TI1ree members of a standing seven-membet· Appellate Body, set up by the DSB and broadly representing the WTO memhership, hear each appeal. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse a panel's legal findings and conclusions.''. Normally appeals should not last more than 60 days, with an absolute maximum dura ti on of 90 days" (but some processes have lasted 14 DSU, Article 4(7). 15 Ibid., Article 6(1).
~ Ibid., Article 8 and, specifically, Article 8(6).
17 lbid., Article 12.
'1S Ibid., Article 12{8).
19 lbict, Article 16(4). lt is possible, in theory, for WTO members to refuse ~ by a consensus decision -the adoption of the panel report Article 16(4) of the DSU states: Wilhin 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report .shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by conBensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered (or adoption by the DSB ur'ltil after completion of the appeal'. · 20 lbid., Article 17(6).
up to 140 days). 23 The DSB must adopt bath the AppelJale Body's report and the panel report (as reversed, amended or upheld) \'lÎlhin 30 days of the circulation of the Appellate Body's report. Reports of the panel and the Appellate Body must be made public." · The final phase of the WTO dispute pro cess is the surveillance of implementation of the DSB's recommendations (i.e. the conclusions of the panel or AppelJale Body) and the regulation of counter-measures in case of non-compliance, as provided for in Atticles 21 and 22 of the DSU. The DSU generally prohibits the unilateral determination of any WTO violations dming and outside the DSU process. 25 'I11e DSB monitors how adopted recommendations are implemented, and un til the winning member is satisfied, the case remains on the DSB agenda until the issue is resolved. Panel and Appellate Body repotts usually identify specifie WTO violations (pursuant to the claims alleged by the complaining parties), but leave to sovereign wro members the flexibility (over a reasonable petiod of lime) ta correct the challenged measures in a mann er thal is compatible with wro mies.
In case the offending member fails ta comply with the DSB recommendations witllin the ti me frame agreed or arbitrated for implementation (which vaties between 8 and 15 months) or if parties cannot agree on mutually acceptable compensation within 20 da ys, 26 a patty may ask the m1ginal panel (and the Appellate Body thereafter) to review the implementing measure. 27 In situations where the implementing measures are found to be incompatible .with the WTO's rnles, the successful member may ask the DSB for permission to impose tt·ade sanctions" corresponding to the leve! of tt·ade nullified and impaioed by the incompatible measure. The DSB may authorize requested sanctions, but arbitration petformed by the original panel -from which there is no appeal -on the actual leve! of snch nullification and impairment of benefits is possible. Sanctions are supposed to be imposed on the same sector(s) as !hase covered by the violations, but crossretaliation in other sectors and other agreements are also possible. 
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of the DSU is entitled "The Strengthening of the Multilatet'al System'. 1t provides th at: 23(1) When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective ·of the covered agreements, they shall have re course to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Ondetstanding.
23 (2) Atticle 23 of the DSU is one of the most fu nd ameutai pi'Ovisions of the DSU. Not only does il pmhibit unilateral measures or countermeasures, and arguably sorne State 'behaviour' thal would potentially 'threaten the multilateral !rade system'," but il also provides !hat the wro has exclusive jmisdiction for allowing remedies for violations of the WTO Treaty. 30 Il seems, thus, as ifWTO members have in advance provided to the wro adjudicating bodies exclusive jmisdiction to address violations of wro rule s.
In other words, the WTO adjudicating bodies ''lill 'attract' jurisdiction over any trade-related disputes. The WTO dispute-seUlement mechanism cau be ttiggered easily and quickly, and panels and the Appellate Body \'lÎII often be expected to make mpid rulings, arguably to the exclusion of the jurisdictions of other international fora. The exclusive and powerful ibid., at para. 6.14. See also ibid., paras 7. This provision refers to the possibility of using other mechanisms under other international agL·eements, in parallel to those of the WTO.
THE DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS OF MEAS
Most binding environ mental treatîes contain more or Jess detailed provisions on the seUlement of disputes. They are charactelized by their optional nature and by the fact th at in most cases their results are not usually binding on the parties.
The basic madel of dispute seUlement in MEAs involves a progressive process that facilitates dispute resolution by subjecting the dispute ta gradually more intrusive and formal mechanisms. The scope of dispute-seUlement mechanisms is normally limited to disagt·eements arising from the intet-pretation or application of the MEA. In cases of dispute, the first step is generally to seek a solution through consultation, negotiation or other peaceful means between the parties. If this fails, a second stage may consist of a joint request by the disputing parties for intervention by a thit·d party through good offices, fact-findîng, conciliation or mediation. 32 Under each of these methods, the thit·d party attempts to assist the pat1ies to reach an agreement that ends the dispute, although the leve! of involvement valies. 33 with negotiation or mediation, the case may be submiUed to binding dispute seUlement, frequently at the ICJ or thwugh arbitration, if the countties in dispute agree to it. The majority of MEAs do not oblige pat1ies to solve their disputes through binding adjudication processes (su ch as th at of the ICJ), although in many cases parties can set their preferences upon ratification of the agreement. Some MEAs fot·esee compulsory conciliation, ifpat1ies have not accepted the same or any procedure for dispute seUlement!' For that pm-pose, a conciliation commission may be created at the request of any party. However, unless otherwise agreed, the decision or recommendation of the commission is again not binding. Some MEAs establish that parties must consider the decision in good faith!'
In recent years 1 many environmental tt-eaties have incot-porated free-standing non-compliance procedures, used as a dispute-avoidance mechanism.
36 Noncompliance procedures are characterized by their non-controversial and technical assistance-oriented nature. Tiley are not·mally administered by a special dedicated institutional mechanism, such as a standing or implementation committee. The size and composition of the commiUee may vary, but in general, they should try to reflect an 'equitable geographical distlibution' (for instance the Montreal Protocol) or an adequate representation of those members most likely to be affected by the MEA (for instance proposais for the Committee of the Base] Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal).
37 Severa! possibilities ttigger the immobilization of su ch a ·commiUee. Review often can be initiated either thmugh a complaint fr·om one pa11y against another, or by the secretaliat of the MEA in any situation where it suspects a, party of non-compliance. 38 It has been common under the Montreal Protocol to 34 See, for instance, Vienna ConvenUon for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Article 11(5); Conyention on Biological DiVer'sity, Artide 27(4). · initiale the review through self-reporting by a party defaulting on its obligations despite its best efforts to the contraty. It might fmther be possible to authorize a standing or implementation committee ta starl a review at its own initiative if, upon its own pet·iodic review of the secretariat's analytical summalies of information pwvided by the parties, the commiUee conclu des that there is evidence of possible non-implementation or non-compliance, and provided neither a pat1y, nor the convention secretariat on its own, has ta ken the necessaty steps to bting the case formally before the standing or implementation committee.
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Often, ifthe standing or implementation committee of a MEA finds that a pat1y will not be in compliance, despite best effot1s, it may issue recommendations in the form of a repm1 and submit the recommendations to the Conference of the Pat1ies of the MEA to decide on the steps to bting the State back into compliance. These non-compliance procedures usually do not dictate a standard response ta aH cases of noncompliance, but instead allow patties to tailor theil· responses to the specifie circumstances and needs of the non-compliant party. This response may include assistance with collecting and repot1ing data, technical or financial assistance, technology transfer, or information transfer and personnel h-aining.
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If a committee finds that a party has not made a suffident effot1 to meet its obligations, ot· if it is otherwise warranted by the circumstances, the commiUee may recommend punitive action against the non-compliant patty. These can range from suspension of the pat1y's rights and ptivlleges under the MEA (for example deniai of access to fi nan cial resom·ces) to tmde resttictions." Under the Montreal Protocol, parties also adopted an indicative list of measures that might be ta ken by ils Meeting of the Patti es in respect of noncompliance. 43 'Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specifie rights and priVileges und er the Protoco\, whether or not subject to tlme limits. including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfer of techno!ogy, financial mechanism and instilutlonal arrangements.' See ibid., para. 1.
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Questions on the binding or non-binding nature of the response measures resulting from a non-compliance procedure 44 and the relationship of the non-compliance procedure with the dispute-seUlement mechanisms foreseen in a MEA have yet to be answered in these regimes. 45 Moreover, the use of dispute-seUlement mechanisms in MEAs is limited and should further develop in the futm·e.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DISPUTE·SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS OF MEAS AND THOSE OF THE WTO
As seen above, most MEAs do not have any compulsmy dispute-seUlement mechanisms thal produce binding decisions. Furthermore, they do not refer to any exclusive jurisdiction 1 but provide for a 1 menu~ of dispute-seUlement means, usually consisting of the ICJ or arbitration to be agreed by the pat1ies 46 The non-compliance mechanisms do not provide for any exclusive authority in favour of the MEA bodies, but their triggering mechanisms are generally fairly simple-often the non-compliance provisions may be invoked by the non-complying MEA State, by a competent executive body of the MEA or, eventually, by another MEA State.
The situation is different \vithin the WTO, where At1-icle 23 of the DSU provides th at WTO-related disputes cau be debated only before the WTO's adjudicating #This question a rose, for ii1Stance, under the Montreal Prolocol regime during the non-compliance procedure conceming Russia. ln this regard, it is also interesting to analyse Artide 18 o( lhe Kyolo Protocol, Which stipulates that 'any procedJres and mechanisms under this Article entai ling binding consequences shall be adopted by meai1S of an amendment of this Protocol', sugge.sting that responses lhat are not part of such an amendment would nol be binding. For a detailed discussion of compliance in the Montreal and Kyoto regimes, see J. Werksman, 'Comp!iance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone intO a ~FleXible~ Regime', 9 Yb/EL (1998), 47.
45 Al1hough considered distinct and .separa te procedures, the rel a· tionship betv1een traditional dispute-settlement mechanisms and non-compliance procedures raises conceplual questions concern. ing. for instance, the need to exhaust proceedings or the simu\lane-ous actiVation of proceedings~ HO\•ro'ver, sorne authors consider thal, for instance in the case of the Montreal Protocol, be cause an implementation committee is a polilical organ, a case would nol be sub ji.Jd/ce if discussed nor res /Ud/cata if decided. For a detailed discussion, see G. Handl ami Ë. Deutsch, n. 37 above, at 37; and see M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Norr-Compliance?
Refiections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol', 3 Yb/EL (1993), 123.
-»The exception to this rule is the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which enjoys mandatory jurisdiction over ali State parties to UNCLOS in disputes relating to activites based in the seabed CY'ea (section 5 of Part Xl of UNCLOS). For a detailed description of the ITLOS regirpe, see P. Sands (ed.), Manual on lntematlonal Courts and 7tibunals (Bulterworths, 1999), 39-40. bodies (a panel, the Appellate Body or through arbilration undet· Article 25 of the DSU). It also seems clear thal it is only hefore the wro adjudicating bodies that WTO violations can be the abject of claims 47 (which is distinct from stating thal only the WTO Agreement can be invoked, argued, or interpreted by panels and the Appellate Body when examining a claim ofWTO violation). Moreover, recommendations of panels and the Appellate Body through their quasiautomatic adoption by the DSB are binding, and, if not respected, may lead to sanctions.
Y et, a single dispute, or aspects thereof, may involve issues !hat would appear to be of relevance to the noncompliance and the dispute-seUlement provisions of a MEA, while the same governmental actions also affect trade and are th us WTO maUers covered under Al1icle 23 of the DSU. Based on At1icle 23 of the DSU and the automatic nature of the DSU mechanism, it is doubtful that any WTO adjudicating body would stop its pt·ocess for the only reason thal a pal'allel dispute is being addressed in another forum, unless the parties agree so. Il may, therefore, be difficult to speak of pure conflicts between dispute fora, since wro members have declared WTO fora as exclusively mandated to adjudicate WTO-related disputes. Moreover, the abject and PUl'Pose of a MEA's mechanism may often differ from those of the WTO and thus not deal with the same subject maUers. This leads to the conclusion thal while a MEA party is the subject of a non-compliance (ol' dispute-seUlement) process for its actions or inactions, the same governmental action(s) (and their trade impacts) could be examined before a WTO adjudicating body, pursuant to an allegation of a WTO violation. This is indeed a frequent situation, where States are bou nd by multiple obligations thal apply in a concomitant manner and are subject ta parallel jurisdictions. For instance~ in the Southern Bluefm Thna Case, the arbitral tribunal stated thal: in the absence of an intemational authotity to assess such conflict, parties may be faced with two parallel
procedures.
An example of such parallel jul'isdlctlons between the WTO mechanism and thal of another treaty is the EC -Sword{ish dispute'' Iti thal dispute, Chile enacted swordfish conservation measures by regulating equipment and limiting the number of fish thal could be caught by denying new permits. 6° Chile effectlvely prohibited the utillzation of ils pot1s for the ]andlng and servicing of EC-based long-liners and factory ships that disregard minimum conservation standat·ds. The EC challenged these measuoes as being contrary to ils WTO tights pursuant to Al1icle V of GATT, which provides for the free transit of goods along the territories of its members. Chile contended thal the WTO does not limit ils sovereignty over its pot1s and demanded that the EC enact and enforce conservation measures for its fishing operations on the high seas, in accordance '\vith the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS). Chile then initiated the disputeseUlement provisions of UNCLOS and invited the EC to agree to resolve the dispute before the Intel'natlonal Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The EC fin ally agreed to the formation of an ai·bitral ttibunal under UNCLOS. In this case, the substantive issues before the WTO adjudicating bodies could have included the tight of Chile to ben elit from the application of At1icle XX of GATT, which authmizes a WTO member to give pLimity-under cet1ain conditions -to environmental considerations when acting pm·suant to other h-eaties (such as UNCLOS).
In a situation such as the EC -.Sword{ish dispute, it is conceivable that bath 'adjudicating bodies (that of ITLOS and WTO) would examine whether UNCLOS effectively requires, authmizes or tolerates Chile's measuoes, and tlms whether such Chilean measures are ln compliance with UNCLOS -an element that could influence the panel (or the Appellate Body) in its decision whether Chile may benefit from the application of Article XX. The two institutions could have reached different conclusions on factual aspects ot· on the intet'Pt-etation of the MEA's provisions. Fm1unately, the pat11es reached an agreement and suspended theil' disputes bath before ITLOS and before the WTO. Howevet·, this example highlights that, at the moment, there does not seem to be any solution to this possibility of having different ttibunals handling diffet-ent aspects of the same dispute. The issue is whether, wh en and how WTO members thal at-e also parties to MEAs should deal with the many different dispute findings from these varions fora cau lead to disparate and even inconsistent conclusions.
Timing between the Different DisputeSeUlement Mechanisms: ls there an Obligation to Exhaust the Dispute-SeUlement Mechanism of MEAs before using those of the WTO? Even if there is no conflict in a strict sense," the relationship between the dispute-settlement mechanisms of MEAs and those of the WTO may still raise important tensions, namely with regard to their sequence and timing. A 1996 repot"l of the WTO CommiUee on Trade and Environment (CTE) stipulated in ils conclusions and recommendations th at: if a dispute arises bet\veen WTO members, parties to a MEA, over the use of trade measures they are applying betvreen themselves pursuant to the MEA, they should consider trying to resolve it through the dispute-settlement mechanisms available under the MEA. 6 z Y et this, at best, has solely the legal value of a recommendation of the WTO CTE, which would find relevance in a WTO panel, but does not constitute an amendment to Article 23 of the DSU. More directly, if a MEA obliges its parties to use its dispute-seUlement mechanism in case of disagreement," the refusai to use such a MEA mechanism could constitute a violation of the MEA itself. But in the absence of any MEA pmvisions as to when the MEA dispute mechanism is to be used genet·ally, and/or in relation to the WTO mechanism, is there an obligation to 'exhaust' the MEA mechanism before initiating a WTO dispute?" Or would this interpretation be viewed as inhibiting the right of a WTO member under the DSU to initiale a formai dispute whenever it considers that a benefit has been impaired or nullified?
:;, Except if one is of the view that pursuing the DSU prooess wou!d necessarify empty the mechanisms of the MEA of their object and purpose. MJn international law, there is a pr1nciple oblîging States to e>1laust local remedies before having recourse to international dispuJe· settlement mechanisrrn>, but the dispute mechanism of a MEA is not a local remedy and thus oannot benefit from the application of this principle. On the issue of the eXhaustion of local remedies in international law and its application to WTO jutisprudence, see P.J. ·In practice, therc appears to be no real obligation to exhaust MEA dispute-seUlement mechanisms before initiating a procedure under the WTO; moreover, most of the procedures in MEAs are not compulsory. This indicates that acrimonious parties may potentially use the WTO dispute-seUlement procedure for maUet-s already dealt with undet· a MEA and thal the WTO dispute-seUlement mechanism could not be stopped.
Shot1 of any agreement between the patties and in the absence of any interriational mie as to how these different mechanisms interact, many scenarios may emerge. As discussed before, in light of the quasiautomatic nature of the WTO dispute process and Atticle 23 of the DSU, it is doubtful thal a WTO panel would decline jmisdiction because another dispute process -albeit more relevant and beUer eqnippedhas been seized of a similar or related dispute. If bath processes were triggered at the same time, it is probable th at the WTO panel pro cess would go mu ch faster than the MEA process. So, what arguments can be raised before a WTO adjudication body with regard to a related MEA's dispute-seUlement mechanism?
Good Faith Arguably, the ptinciple of good faith would require a State to negotiate settlements to disputes that it faces under international instruments to which lt is bound. The ICJ bas stated !hat:
the obligation [to negotiate] constitutes a special application of a principle which underlies ail international relations, and which is moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. N> Even in situations where the WTO process bas been tliggered, governments can continue the MEA dispute process if they consider it necessaty or beneficiai ta the WTO procedure, for instance as evidence of good faith efforts to negotiate l\ mutually agreed solution. In this sense, tl~e 'WI'O panel may examine and consider a MEA dispute avoidancefseUiement mechanism as a legal fact.
In the US -Shrimp/Tttrtle Case, the Appellate Body stated that the USA bad failed to undet1ake 'sel"ious act"oss-the-board negotiations' with othel" WTO members." Such refusai was one of the elements used by the · Appellate Body to conclude thal the USA had applied its measures in a discriminatorY manner, contrary to the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX of GATT, which itself is an expression of the general plinciple of good faitll. The Appellate Body was obviously not speaking of DSU consultations, since these had taken place in this case. In this context, one may argue that · the 'obligation to consult prim· to imposing unilateral measures' has attained the leve! of a general plincip\e of law. The absence of prior ccnsultation with a view to reaching a cooperative agreement \'lÎthin a MEA may be evidence of bad faith and as a violation of due pmcess, contrary to the good faith application of the measure as required by the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX." But would this good faith plinciple oblige a WTO member, which is also a party to a MEA, to use first (and exhaust) the more specifie MEA mechanism, even when it overlaps \vith that of the WTO? It is doubtful. Arguably, the refusa\ to use the MEA dispute mechanism may constitute a violation of the MEA, but wou\d not ccnstitute a violation of the WTO per se. But such refusai to exhaust the MEA's dispute-seUlement mechanism -bence to not consult fully and properly \'lÎth the most appropliate and expett fot'Um -could be an element used by a panel or the Appellate Body wh en assessing the good faith of a patty to a WTO dispute. In this sense, one may argue that when interpreting the requirements of Article XX and other GATT provisions, the existence of such a MEA mechanism and the binding conclusions o(a MEA process should be taken into account wh en relevant in the interpretation and application of Atticle XX.
Abuse of Rights
Expertise Aiticle 13 of the DSU allows any WTO panel to request from the pàtties, or from other sour"';', any relevant information. Arguably, this cculd mclude evidence from proceedings in other fora.
~or insta~Jce, a wro panel may want to require expèit mformatton from a MEA · secretatiat, or, with the agreement of the parties, it may also want to use the analysis or data collected dming a MEA process and it could do so in using Atticle 13 of the DSU. 
INVOLVEMENT OF MEA SECRETARIATS
WTO members should encourage greater involvement of relevant MEA secretariats in dispute-seUlement pmcedm·es. Even before the forma] panel process, MEA secretadats could, for instance, be invited to send comments and participate in consultations or mediation, A decision by the DSB could also encourage panels to fully exercise their rights under Article 13 of the DSU to request information from MEA secretadats." The advantage of earl y involvement of relevant MEA secretariats is that these experts may be in a beUer position to assess compliance with a MEA, which is a factor that may also be relevant in the panel process. For instance, reference to a MEA compliance (or dispute) mechanism could be used as one of the elements in estab\ishing that discdmination in the application of the measure should not be characterized as 'unjustifiable', or that its application was not a 'disguised restriction on international trade' for the purposes of the chapeau to Atticle XX of GATT. The respect given to a non-compliance process by MEA patties can also be viewed as evidence of State practice. Even if this is the practice of only one patty, il may still be a relevant element to be taken into account when interpreting whether th at parti cu\ ar WTO member is covered by the provisions of Atticle XX
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USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERTS
In ail WTO-related disputes, experts may be consulted. States should be encouraged to rely on such outside expet1s at the early stages of a dispute to collect evidence which could he used latet· -should the 
DISPUTE PREVENTION AND MEDIATION-FURTHERING THE USE OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE DSU
To prevent trade and enviroiunent issues from escalating into forma] WTO trade disputes, the provisions of Atticle 5 of the DSU, on mediation, conciliation at)d good offices, may be used before invokîng theiL· right to fm·ma\, binding dispute-seUlement proceedings. This provision allow disputing pat1ies to voluntatily undertake third party assisted discussions at any stage dming the course of a dispute and permit the Director General, in an ex officio capacity, to offer these services. Despite their aUractiveness, the Atticle 5 procedures have never been used because they require the agreement from al\ the disputing parties. To prevent future conflicts from escalating into full trade disputes, WTO members may wish to consider how to use more effectively WTO third patty assisted processes.
In tbeir various fot·ms, fact-finding, conciliation, good offices and mediation involve a third party to clarify the facts surrounding the dispute, to assist the disputing parties in communicating, ta encourage them ta re-evaluate their positions, ta offer compromise suggestions and solutions, and to generally maintain a constructive environment for discussion. In the case of environment-related trade disputes, a third party could, for example, assist the parties to consider options other than a trade ban, such as cettification and labelling, or additional financial and technical assistance to address the issue at its source.
Guidelines on Atticle 5 of the DSU could be created to encourage early notification and exchange of information. They could also provide opportunities fot· affected stakeholders, relevant international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Pro· gramme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Development Programme, and the relevant MEA secretariats to be consulted to provide expett evidence and interpretation on a matter in dispute. To ensure t11ey are not used to delay access to forma\ wro procedures, the Article 5 procedures could run in para\lel to the consultation period, or forma] dispute-seUlement procedures. Increased use of Attic\e 5 procedures would have significant advantages for both developed and deve\oping countries. As an informa] process, they could operate outside the forma] wro structure and require no changes to wro tules. They may also address the concems of environmentalists about the WTO dispute-seUlement system becoming an international environmenta\ comt. By involving relevant stakeho\ders, Atticle 5 procedures would engage the creativity of expetts and civil society to find solutions to underlying environmental problems. Attic\e 5 procedures could also allow patties to come to a negotiated seUlement without the need for the use of forma\ and expensive binding dispute-seUlement procedures." On 17 July 2001, the Director-General issued a communication encouraging the use of Atticle 5 DSU procedures. Although sometimes invoked by one party to a dispute, Article 5 procedures require the consent ofboth patties fot· their operation. to ensm·e that this process does not unduly delay access to the wro dispute mechanisms, provisions could include the possibility for the complainant party that bas used the EAB mechanisin to 'skip' the consultation process under the DSU and to obtain immediate access to the forma] dispute-seUlement procedure.
SETTING UP OF AN ENVIRONMENT ADVISORY BOARD
CONCLUSION
In the context of a dispute between two WfO members concerning a measure claimed ta be required or authorised by a MEA provision or decision, a WfO member that considers that any of its wro benefits have been nullified or impaired bas an absolute tight to ttigger tl1e WTO dispute-seUlement mechanism and request consultations and the establishment of a panel and, eventua\ly, to initiate para\\ el procedures under the MEA. It is vety unlikely (and might not even be desirable). that a hierarchy between the two systems, MEAs and WTO, be established. The disputeseUlement mechanism . of the WfO is attractive because it is simple, quick and powerfuL However, the WTO dispute-seUlement mechanism cou\d be <>3 The TMB was e-stablished to supervise the implementation of the.
Agreement on Textiles and Clothlng {ATC) and ovef"see disp!1es before formai recourse is had to the WTO dispule·setuemeol system. ln the event thal members are not able to resolVe issues artsing under the ATC tiYoogh bilateral discussions,. they may request the TMB to consider the matter and maKe recommandations to them. l( a member is unable to conform to the TMB's recommandations it is required to proVide the TMB.VIith reasons for its {ail ure to do so. improved so as to ensure that the expet'lise developed in MEAs, together with actions taken pursuant to MEA provisions and dispute-seUlement and avoidance mechanisms, are duly taken into account in the WTO dispute-seUlement process. But this may not suffioe. TI!et·e is a need to strengthen compliance and dispute-seUlement mechanisms in MEAs so as to enhance the effective implementation of MEAs, which may lead to fewer challenges before the WTO and provide an important source of mutual suppmt between the dispute-settlement systems of MEAs and the WTO.
